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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH
Appellant,

)
)

v.
)
STATE OF UTAH
Appellee.

CaseNo.20040361-CA

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELANT

ARGUMENT I
In the defendant's brief he argued that his plea in abeyance agreement should have
been declared a misplea, because the terms of the agreement violated the express terms of
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5). In support of his argument he cited two Utah
cases State v. Kav. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) and State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah
App. 1996).
In Moss, the court state that since the plea in abeyance agreement had violated the
express terms of section 77-2a-3(7) this constituted obvious reversible error. In
accordance with Moss. Mr. Schubarth has argued that his plea in abeyance agreement
should be declared a misplea because it also violates the express terms of another statute
Section 77-2a-2(5).
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On the other hand, the appellee has argued in its brief that the defendant is not
entitled to a misplea because any error committed at the trial court level was invited by the
defendant.
Mr. Schubarth believes this to be an invalid argument because the conditions in his
matter and the condititons of Moss are not distinguishable. In Moss, the parties negotiated
a plea in abeyance agreement, both parties requested that the court except the agreement.
Thus inviting the trial court to commit an error, because the terms of the agreement
violated Section 77-2a-3(7). Id. When it was brought to the attention of the court that the
plea in abeyance agreement violated Section 77-2a-3(7), the State of Utah moved the court
for a misplea. Id. The trial court granted the misplea and the decision was affirmed on
appeal. Id.
Like Moss. Mr. Schubarth negotiated a plea in abeyance agreement with the State
of Utah. The agreement stated that Mr. Schubarth would be on probation for six years.
This term violated Section 77-2a-2(5), thus inviting the trial court to commit an error. In
this matter the error was brought to the attention of the trial court. R. 705, Tr. p. 8, line 20
& 21. At which time Mr. Schubarth requested a misplea. The request was denied.
The distinction between Moss and the present matter has to do with which party is
requesting the misplea. In Moss, it was the State of Utah that requested the misplea. Id.
In this matter, the defendant is requesting the misplea. In circumstances where both
parties request that the court include in their plea in abeyance agreements terms that
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expressly violate statutes, it would be a double standard to grant mispleas to the State of
Utah and not to defendants.
ARGUMENTn
Point I
The State of Utah has the burden to prove a violation of a condition of probation
by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990). In
Mr. Schubarth's brief he questioned whether the State of Utah carried its burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated a law in violation of his probation.
At the hearing the State of Utah did not introduce evidence that Mr. Schubarth was
convicted of a bad check charge in Nevada. The only evidence they introduced was a
docketing statement showing that Mr. Schubarth had been charged with writing a bad
check and hearsay statementsfromMr. Hines, stating that Mr. Schubarth had been
charged, but that he did not know the results. R. 705, Tr.p.23, line 9-12.
In this matter, the State of Utah has the cart before the horse. It is generally, the
practice of prosecutors to wait until a defendant is convicted of a crime before holding the
hearing on the probation violation. Then the State of Utah can introduce the certified
copy of the conviction. However, in this matter they did not wait, they proceeded before
final disposition of the bad check charge. At best there was confusion as to the result of
the charge in Nevada. The State of Utah introduced no evidence that the issue had been
resolved. Mr. Schubarth's testimony was contradictory and indicated someone unfamiliar
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with the system. He stated, that he pled not guilty. R. 705, Tr.p. 39, line 7-8. However,
he indicated that some type of fine might have been paid by his attorney. R. 705, Tr.p.39,
line 25.
The Appellee in its brief argues that the trial court correctly found that Mr.
Schubarth committed the crime of passing a bad check, because Mr. Schubarth did not
"explain why, having pled not guilty, he paid a fine and the case was closed." Appellee's
brief page 13.
The appellee errors in arguing that the defendant did not properly explain his
statements, it is not the defendant's burden of proof. The state did not introduce any
evidence that Mr. Schubarth had been convicted of passing a bad check. Therefore, if the
court assumed that Mr. Schubarrth was convicted of passing a bad check, this was an
error.
POINT II
The appellee did not refute Mr. Schubarth's second point and thus Mr. Schubarth
asserts his argument without further explanation.
ARGUMENT n i
With regard to argument III, Both the appellant and the appellee are in agreement
with regard to the law. Both parties have cited similar rules. For example, "When
interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. See Central Florida
Investments. Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc's. 2002 UT 3, If 12,40 P. 3d 599." Appellee's Brief
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p. 15. "This Court will 'first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intentions of the parties.' Id. (quoting Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.
2d 1382,1385 (Utah 1989))". Appellee's Brief p. 15. "In evaluating whether the plain
language is ambiguous, [this court will] attempt to harmonize all of the contract's
provisions and all of its terms. I<J." Appellee's Brief p. 15. '" Where construction is
called for, it is the duty of the court to interpret an ambiguity [in a manner that makes] the
judgment more reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and [that] brings the judgment into
harmony with the facts and the law.' Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of
Salt Lake County. 44 P.3d 642115 (Utah 2002).'" Appellant's Brief p. 17. "'In addition,
we construe any ambiguities in the order against the prevailing parties who drafted i t . . . '
Id. '"Appellant's Brief p. 17.
Applying the rules stated above, Mr. Schubarth believes his interpretation of the
plea in abeyance agreement makes the most sense. First, it was the State of Utah that
prepared the agreement so any ambiguities should be construed against them. Second, Mr.
Schubarth believes it was the intentions of the parties, that Mr. Schubarth only had to pay a
substantial amount of the restititution every six months. This interpretation gives meaning
to the following sentence in the agreement: "If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have
not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he has
substantially complied with the restititution payments. R. 360 (Bolding and
underlining added). Substantial compliance was all that required by the agreement as long
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as the full restitution amount was paid by December 26, 2008. R. 361.
In fact, the appellee concedes that Mr. Schubarth's interpretation of the plea in
abeyance agreement is correct. The appellee merely restates Mr. Schubarth's argument
when the appellee states, "the 'substantial compliance' clause merely establishes what is to
happen if defendant does not fulfill his obligation under the agreement. If defendant does
not make the required payment timely, then the 'substantial compliance' clause provides
that the defendant will not be in violation if he has 'substantially complied' with the
restitution payments." Appellee's brief p. 16.
Mr. Schubarth agrees with this interpretation completely. The agreement stated that
if Mr. Schubarth had not made the payment of $22,880.00 within six months he was to be
brought back to court to see if he had substantially complied with the agreement. Further,
as the appellee has stated, if he had substantially complied then he would not be in
violation of the agreement.
However, Mr. Schubarth believes this is not what occurred. The trial court did not
determine or make any findings regarding whether Mr. Schubarth had substantially
complied with the agreement. Instead, the trial court applied an all or nothing standard,
determinining that if the whole $22,880.00 was not paid then he was in violation of the
agreement, thus committing error. Therefore, Mr. Schubarth requests that this matter be
remanded to the trial court for a correct review of whether he substantially complied with
the agreement.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should remand to the trial court for either the
entry of a misplea, and a trial, or a new order to show cause hearing.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2004.
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Sidwell
Attorney for Appellant
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